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“Deceptive site ahead” in Chrome, or a Search Console security notice. Traffic is already being lost, and your domain's reputation is at risk.
Visitors are redirected to a pharmacy, casino, or scam page. The usual cause is an injected loader in the theme header or a rewritten .htaccess file.
Outbound spam or abuse complaints have forced the host to act. Restoration now depends on them, and every hour offline costs you orders.
Your password stopped working, or your account vanished. The attacker has administrator access and is actively protecting it.
Hundreds of Japanese or pharma URLs indexed under your domain. Cleaning the files does not remove them from Google on its own.
There is no visible damage, but the site has slowed down and contains accounts you did not create. The infection may be dormant: one case I investigated remained inactive for 84 days before it was activated.
A scanner or your host says the site is vulnerable, but you cannot see anything wrong. This is common: there may be no malware yet, but one automated attack could trigger any of the problems above.
Your host's scanner deletes the infected files, usually while the site is still running. An hour later they are back. Nothing changed about how the attacker got in, and the malware keeps spare copies the scanner never checks.
The first step is to stop the malware from running. Most sites go offline for a few hours, while stores are cleaned on an isolated copy; I then trace the server logs to the initial attack, identify the entry point, remove every hidden copy, patch the vulnerability, and verify the result from outside the server.
I take a complete snapshot of the files and database before making any changes, then stop the malware from running. Most sites go offline for a few hours; where downtime affects revenue, I work on an isolated copy instead, then rotate passwords, regenerate authentication salts, and invalidate every session and cookie on the domain.
I compare every WordPress file with a clean copy of the same version, manually review theme and plugin files, check the database for injected content, and trace the server access logs back to the initial attack. Scanners provide useful evidence, but I review every result myself: in one recent case, most of the 41 findings were security plugins detecting their own files.
A real infection rarely sits in one place; it stores additional copies across the site so one can restore another after deletion. In one recent case there were nine, and every copy had to be removed in the same pass:
mu-pluginsplugins/db.php · object-cache.php.htaccess · .user.inifunctions.phpwp_options.dat · .lkghashed .zipWP-CronI remove every copy manually instead of relying on an auto-repair button that may miss part of the infection or damage a working site.
I close the vulnerability, update WordPress core, plugins and themes, and migrate unsupported PHP where needed. Unused plugins are removed, firewall and login protection are configured, admin accounts and file permissions are audited, wp-config and xmlrpc are locked down, and off-site automated backups are set up.
I confirm the clean scan from outside the server. If Google flagged the site, I request a security review and clear the Search Console warning so the red interstitial is removed.
You receive a written report covering what I found, what I removed, what changed, and how the attacker got in. The service also includes 30 days of monitoring, so I can spot suspicious activity before you do.
Getting the infection off the site
Making sure it does not come back
The infection is removed and the site is safe to put back online. Further hardening remains your responsibility.
Cleaned, patched, hardened, backed up and monitored, so the way in is closed rather than just emptied.
Per website, not per server or hosting account. Several sites on one account are quoted per site - the account-level check is part of every job.
Cleaning the server does not remove every trace from Google. Fake verified owners may retain access to your data, while injected spam URLs can remain indexed after their source files are removed.
This add-on is optional. If you are comfortable handling the work yourself, the process takes time rather than specialist tools.
For 60 days after handover, I will clean any reinfection on a site I recovered at no charge and with the same priority as a paid emergency. That is the whole promise, and it is why finding the way in is part of every job rather than an upgrade.
After 60 days, most clients move to ongoing WordPress maintenance so updates and backups never lapse again.
You receive more than a scanner export: the written report includes an executive summary, the root cause, a timeline, every changed component and version, and the final verification. It is suitable to forward to your host, client, or insurer.
A tool can list every known weakness on your site; it cannot tell you which one they actually walked through.
I documented the complete recovery process, including every step I take, and made it available for free. If you have backups, some patience, and no live revenue at risk, work through it yourself and call me if the malware comes back.
No form, no discovery call, no commitment. Tell me what you are seeing, and I will explain the problem and the cost of resolving it.
I usually reply within an hour, including evenings and weekends.